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Abstract:  This  paper  is  concerned  with  demonstrating  the  capacity  of  international  human 
rights law and domestic constitutional law to have a synergistic relationship that is focused on 
the ways  in which  the  two  sets of  standards  can be harmonised  rather  than on questions of 
‘superiority’ and ‘inferiority’. Conceiving of the relationship between the two bodies of  law in 
this  way  requires  us  to  recognise  their  shared  dignitary  core  and  the  optimal  effect  of 
international  human  rights  law,  namely  effective  rights‐protection  at  the domestic  level with 
international  law  playing  a  subsidiary  role.  This  paper  uses  the  example  of  LGBT  rights  in 
European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  jurisprudence  to  demonstrate  such  a  synergistic 





























It  is sometimes said that the United States has a particular antipathy to  international  law and 
internationalism;  that  it  neither  ‘gets  it’  nor  wants  to  ‘get  it’.1  This,  in  my  view,  is  a 
misrepresentation of the position of the United States in respect of international law generally, 
although  it  is perhaps  somewhat closer  to  the  truth  in  relation  to  international human  rights 
law  than  in  other  areas.2  This  representation  of  the  United  States’  alleged  relationship with 
international law reflects the fact that both the US and a substantial portion of the international 
legal  community  are  engaged  in  a  process  of  mythologizing  in  relation  to  one  another  that 
perhaps reaches its zenith when it concerns international human rights law. The United States 





















human  rights  law  is  mythologized  as  a  top‐down,  ‘un‐American’,  and  anti‐democratic 
enterprise.4  
 




make  them  the  ideal  theatre  in which  synergistic  and catalytic  interaction between domestic 
and international law can take place. This is, indeed, the type of relationship between domestic 
and international law that is foreseen and intended by international human rights law and has 
happened  in  other  jurisdictions  and  contexts,  such  as  in  relation  to  LGBT  rights  in  (Western) 
Europe.  
 
I  do not  intend  to  argue  that  international  human  rights  law  is  binding  in  domestic  law.  The 
status of international human rights law in domestic legal systems is a matter for those systems 
themselves.  Under  US  constitutional  law  international  human  rights  law  is  part  of  federal 
common  law  inasmuch  as  it  is  customary  international  law  and  reliant  on  incorporation 
inasmuch as it is contained in non‐self‐executing treaties ratified by the United States with the 
advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate.  The  argument made  out  here  does  not  seek  to  challenge 
that. Rather, this article argues that international human rights law is an appropriate source of 
persuasive authority  that ought  to be pleaded  in cases of  constitutional  rights  interpretation. 
This might ensure that, to the extent possible within the text and structure of the Constitution 
itself, rights afforded constitutional protection are harmonious with international human rights 




domestic  rights  law  and  argues  that  it  is  one  of  synergy  rather  than  one  of  superiority  or 
inferiority. Far from the myriad adjudicatory bodies that have appeared in international human 
rights  law  representing  some  kind  of  strong‐arm  measures  by  international  law,  their 
admissibility rules in particular show that the desired state of affairs is one in which rights are 
effectively  protected  in  the  domestic  sphere without  any  recourse  to  the  international  legal 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LGBT rights in Europe. In several different areas of LGBT rights activism and advocacy, litigants 
found  it  necessary  to  bring  their  cases  to  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights,5  based  in 
Strasbourg.   These cases were brought for the purposes of resolving whether domestic laws, by 
which  sexual  and  gender  minorities  were  differentially  treated,  were  permissible  under  the 
European  Convention  on  Human  Rights.6  What  is  important  about  these  cases,  from  the 
perspective  of  this  article,  is  that  they  frequently  involved  the  Court  in  using  synergistic 
decision‐making  processes  such  as  ‘European  consensus’  in  adjudicating  on  the  complaints 
before them. 
 
Having  established  the  possibility  of  a  synergistic  relationship  between  international  and 
domestic  human  rights  law  in  the  second  part  of  the  article  and  the  desirability  and 
appropriateness of such a relationship in the first part, the third part of this article goes on to 
consider whether such a relationship  is possible or appropriate  in the United States given the 
constitutional position of  international  law.  In this Part,  I argue that although there are some 
prima  facie  structural  impediments  to  the  use  of  international  human  rights  law  in 










progress  from  a  set  of  normative  statements,  purely  declaratory  in  manner  (at  least  at  the 
outset8)  to  a  plethora  of  binding  international  instruments  (both  universal,9  regional10  and 


















organisational11);  human  rights  clauses  in  Security  Council  Chapter  VII  Resolutions;12  human 






for  rights  not  only  to  be  enshrined  in  international  instruments  but  also  to  be  effectively 
protected.14  In  this  context,  it  is  abundantly  clear  that  international  human  rights  law’s 
preference  is  for  effective  protection  to  take  place  on  the  domestic  level—international 




resolution.15  The  subsidiary  nature  of  these  adjudicatory  bodies’  jurisdictions  reflects  the 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nature of the ideal relationship between international and domestic human rights protection as 
both a reflective and a synergistic one. International human rights law ought to reflect common 
values and fundamental principles  (or at  least,  those that might have been said to have been 
common and fundamental to the predominantly western states  involved in the emergence of 
international  human  rights  law16)  and  to  offer  an  interlocutor  with  which  domestic  human 
rights (or ‘civil liberties’) law can converse towards an advantageous outcome. Indeed, it is the 
reflectiveness  of  international  human  rights  law  that  makes  it  appropriate  as  a  synergistic 





systems—particularly  in  relation  to  civil  and  political  rights,  which  historically  have  more 
traction  in  most  domestic  jurisdictions18—human  rights  or  civil  liberties  law  is  designed  to 
ensure  that  the  state may  interfere with  one’s  actions  only  inasmuch  as  that  interference  is 
necessary,  proportionate,  and  objectively  justifiable.  When  boiled  down  to  this  core 
constitutionalist value, we can see that domestic and international rights standards that may, at 
first glance, appear  to be  ‘different’  to one another are  in  fact more similar  than might have 
been  thought  and  are  capable  of  synergistic  existence.  Domestic  standards  and  actions  can 
influence international conceptions of rights‐content and the acceptability of state actions and 
vice‐versa.  It therefore makes immense common sense for the jurisprudence of domestic and 
international  courts  and  other  adjudicatory  bodies  to  inform  each  other’s  activities  in 
interpreting the scope and content of relevant rights protections. 
 
These  authorities  would  not  be  binding  precedents,  but  persuasive  ones.  In  this  way, 
international  human  rights  law  can  play  its  logical  catalytic  role  whereby  the  articulation, 




















application  and  giving  effect  to  of  rights  in  international  law  may  catalyse  an  upwards 
harmonisation  of  rights  between  the  domestic  and  international  sphere.  Domestic 
constitutional and other rights‐protecting standards can be invigorated by international human 
rights law, and international human rights law can evolve by reference to domestic standards in 




domestic  courts  are  grappling  with  the  meaning  of  constitutional  standards  in  their 
contemporary context. While the ‘list’ of legally protected rights in either international human 
rights  law  treaties  or  constitutional  documents  is  generally  static  (apart  from  in  cases  of 
amendment of the core document), the content of those rights is not necessarily static. Indeed, 
it  is  arguable  that  in  order  for  constitutions  to  remain  ‘fit  for  purpose’  the  content  of  the 
protected rights must evolve over time. Thus, for example, the right to privacy may be one that 




These  questions  may  not  have  been  in  the  minds  of  the  drafters  of  constitutions  and 









evolution  of  the  other.  Indeed,  as  the  next  part  of  this  Article  shows,  such  a  synergistic  and 
catalytic relationship between domestic and international law is possible and has actually been 
evident  in  relation  to sexual and gender  rights  in  the Council of Europe, where  the European 
Court  of  Human  Rights  has  made  considerable  use  of  its  ‘consensus’  approach  to  its 
interpretation of the right to privacy in the European Convention on Human Rights when faced 
with questions of sexual and gender identity. 




























to  family  life. The Court’s  interpretation of  “family” has been a  channel  through which many 




State  may  not  interfere  in  one’s  Article  8  rights  at  all.  Article  8.2  specifically  outlines  the 
circumstances  in which  the  state may  legitimately  interfere with  the  rights  of  the  individual. 
Legitimate interference requires three elements: 
 
1. Legal  interference  (i.e.  the  interference  has  the  quality  of  law  and  was  introduced 
through legal measures); 
2. Necessity  (i.e.  the  interference  was  necessary  for  the  purposes  of  one  of  the  heads 






The  jurisprudence on  LGBT  rights  and Article  8  is  important  from  this  perspective because  it 
illustrates  the  capacity  for  domestic  and  international  rights  law  to  have  a  synergistic 
relationship.  As  will  be  illustrated  in  the  brief  survey  of  some  relevant  jurisprudence  that 
follows,  the European Court of Human Rights has afforded states a margin of appreciation  in 




margin  of  appreciation  to  naught  thereby  requiring member  states  to  amend  their  domestic 








homosexual  man,  whereas  the  United  Kingdom  claimed  that  it  had  a  large  margin  of 
appreciation  (i.e.  discretion)  in  situations  where  the  protection  of  morals  were  concerned. 
Furthermore  the  UK  submitted  that  the  majority  of  people  in  Northern  Ireland  found  male 





morality  the Court held  that  “[a]s  compared with  the era when  that  legislation was enacted, 
there is now a better understanding, and in consequence an increased tolerance, of consensual 








One  of  only  four  dissenting  judgments  in  Dudgeon  was  that  of  (Irish  judge)  Justice  Walsh, 




religion and morality  in Northern  Ireland. He held  that “[r]eligious beliefs  in Northern  Ireland 
are very firmly held and directly influence the views and outlook of the vast majority of persons 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in  Northern  Ireland  on  questions  of  sexual  morality.  In  so  far  as  male  homosexuality  is 
concerned,  and  particularly  sodomy,  this  attitude  to  sexual  morality  may  appear  to  set  the 
people  of  Northern  Ireland  apart  from  many  people  in  other  communities  in  Europe,  but 
whether that fact constitutes a failing is, to say the least, debatable”.25 He concluded that there 




Given  this  approach  from  the  Irish  judge  in  Strasbourg  it  should,  perhaps,  have  come  as  no 
surprise that the Irish government failed to decriminalise homosexuality despite the fact that it 
appeared to clearly contravene the European Convention as per Dudgeon. David Norris’ claim 




obligation  to  Our  Divine  Lord  Jesus  Christ…proclaiming  a  deep  religious  conviction  and 
faith…with Christian beliefs” and that, as a result, any suggestion that the Constitution allowed 
for  “unnatural  sexual  conduct which Christian  teaching  held  to  be  gravely  sinful” was  clearly 
inaccurate.  The  clear  role  that  Christian  concepts  of  morality  played  in  this  Supreme  Court 
decision  was  also  evident  in  the  Irish  government’s  submissions  to  the  European  Court  of 
Human Rights in this case, where the State argued that “[w]ithin broad parameters the moral 


























criminalising  consensual homosexual  activity will  violate Article 8,  although consensual heavy 
sado‐masochistic activity between homosexuals appears not to enjoy Article 8 protection.32 
 




such  cases  was  Lustig‐Praen  &  Beckett  v  United  Kingdom33  involving  soldiers  who  had  been 
dismissed  from  the  Royal  Navy  as  a  result  of  their  homosexuality.  In  relation  to  the  second 















constituted  a  direct  interference  with  their  rights  to  privacy.  As  a  result,  their  consequent 
dismissal from the armed forces violated Article 8. While the UK government accepted that the 
actions might be deemed violatory they claimed that they were allowable under Article 8.2 of 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the Convention based on  the  legitimate aim of maintaining morale among military personnel 
and,  as  a  result,  of  ensuring  the  fighting  power  and  effectiveness  of  the  armed  forces.  The 
government  further  argued  that  they were  entitled  to  a  large margin  of  appreciation  in  this 







jeopardised  the  effectiveness  of  the  armed  forces,  but  that  such  threats  to  operational 
effectiveness  had  to  be  substantiated  by  reference  to  specific  examples.35  In  considering 
whether  sufficient  reasons  existed  to  believe  that  homosexuals  in  the  armed  forces  would 
deplete  morale  the  Court  found  that  “the  perceived  problems  which  were  identified  in  [a 
relevant]  report as a  threat  to the  fighting power and operational effectiveness of  the armed 
forces  were  founded  solely  upon  the  negative  attitudes  of  heterosexual  personnel  towards 
those  of  homosexual  orientation”36  and  that  to  the  extent  that  they  represented  “a 
predisposed bias”37 towards homosexuals they could not be taken to justify violations of Article 
8 rights. Rather the Court felt that codes of conduct should be introduced, analogous to those 
introduced  in  relation  to service members of  colour and women  in  the military. On  the basis 
that no objective and rational justification had been advanced to justify the Article 8 violation 
the Court held that the Convention did not permit dismissal from the armed forces on the basis 





considered  whether  different  ages  of  consent  for  heterosexual  and  homosexual  sex  were  a 
violation  of  the  right  to  privacy  in  Article  8.  The  applicant  had  been  convicted  of  illegal 




homosexual  relations  than  in  heterosexual  relations.  This,  he  submitted,  hampered  gay 














be  interpreted  in  the  light of present‐day  conditions.”41 Given  the  fact  that most Convention 
member  states  had  equalized  their  ages  of  consent,  a  differential  age  of  consent  must  be 
capable of objective and reasonable justification in order to avoid violating the Convention. The 






realignment  surgery. Most  of  the  cases  taken  in  relation  to  identity  and privacy  concern  the 
birth  certificate  and  whether  or  not  a  state  is  required  to  put  in  place  a  mechanism  for 
amendment  of  the  birth  certificate  following  gender  realignment.  This  issue  can  cause 







In Rees  v United Kingdom,42 a  case  concerning a post‐operative  female‐to‐male  complainant, 
the  Court  stressed  the  lack  of  consensus  among  the  Council  of  Europe  states  as  regards  the 
means by which  a  state  should  give  effect  to  one’s  right  to  respect  for  their  private  life  and 
identity.  In  fact  the  Court  held  that  the  law was  going  through  “a  transitional  stage”  in  this 
respect and, as a result, that States enjoyed a very wide margin of appreciation in this respect.43 
As it stood transsexuals in the UK were in a position to change their name by deed poll and to 
have  that  change  recognised  on  a  number  of  official  documents,  including  passports.  By 
indicating  one’s  preferred  prefix  the  Court  felt  that  this  procedure went  some way  towards 
affording respect to one’s Article 8 rights. Despite this, however, there were certain situations 
in which a resident in the UK was required to use the unchangeable birth certificate in order to 
confirm  their  identity,  which  caused  considerable  embarrassment,  shame  and  hurt  for  the 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applicant. This notwithstanding the Court felt that amending a birth certificate would constitute 
falsification of facts at the time of birth and that where, as in the UK, there were some schemes 





Rees was  quickly  followed  by Cossey  v  United  Kingdom,44  which  concerned  a  post‐operative 
male‐to‐female complainant. Once again the complainant alleged that the UK’s failure to allow 
for  amendment  of  a  birth  certificate was  a  violation  of  Cossey’s  Article  8  privacy  rights.  The 








The  first  case  in which  an  applicant  successfully  used  Article  8  to  oblige  the  state  to  extend 
official  recognition of  realigned  gender was B  v  France.46  In  France  the  applicant was  strictly 
confined  in  terms of  choice of name and gender was encoded  in a personal  identity number 
which  was  required  for  a  variety  of  interactions  with  government  and  private  entities.  As  a 
result  of  this,  and  because  the  sophisticated  French  system  of  recording  personal  identity 
would require only minor changes, the Court found that France was required to recognise the 
applicant’s  gender.  Interestingly,  this  decision  was  not  based  on  the  state’s  margin  of 






sought,  inter  alia,  to  have  her  birth  certificate  amended  to  reflect  her  realigned  gender. 
Goodwin  noted  particularly  that  the  UK  government  had  failed  to  take  appropriate  steps  to 
respect her identity despite the Court’s advice in previous cases to keep the law under review 
and  in  line  with  changes  in  comparative  law.  She  stressed  the  rapid  changes  in  scientific 
understanding of and social attitudes towards transsexuals and complained that these were not 
matched  by  legal  reform.  In  particular  she  stressed  the  various  laws  that  disadvantaged 













In  its  assessment  of  the  merits  the  Strasbourg  Court  held  that  in  order  to  be  effective  the 






transsexualism  and  held  that  there  was  no  scientific  argument  against  legal  recognition  of 
realigned  gender.  The  Court  found  that  only  four  member  states  (including  the  United 
Kingdom)  had  no  mechanism  of  legal  recognition  following  gender  realignment  and  was 
influenced by the emerging international consensus on this issue. All of this combined indicated 
that  an  international  legal,  social,  scientific,  psychological  and  medical  consensus  on 
transsexualism was emerging. Given all of  the above, and given the existence of a number of 





illustrates  the  type  of  synergistic  relationship  that  is  possible  between  international  and 
domestic human rights  law. Where appropriate, the Court used the margin of appreciation to 
allow states some discretion in how to approach LGBT rights but where a tipping point could be 
identified—based  largely  on  emergent  practice  in  other  states—the  Court  issued  clear 
interpretations of the content and scope of the right to privacy as it related to LGBT rights and 
dramatically reduced the margin of appreciation. The margin of appreciation  is a key concept 
within ECHR  law and gives states discretion  in questions of particular  sensitivity.  Importantly, 
however, the margin of appreciation does not constitute a carte blanche for states to do as they 
wish. As a consensus emerges, particularly on issues of sensitivity or issues in relation to which 
the  law may be  in a  transitional  stage,  the margin will  become narrower until  it  is no  longer 
acceptable for a state to operate in a manner inconsistent with the convention rights as given 
effect by common European practice. The margin of appreciation therefore decreases in size as 
consensus  increases. By corollary, as  the margin decreases the obligation on states  to amend 
their domestic law to recognise changing consensus increases even before a de jure obligation 
arises  through  a  bright‐line  judgment of  the Court  clarifying  that  a  Convention provision  can 
now be said to protect certain behaviours under the rubric of privacy. In addition, the narrower 
the margin and greater the consensus the more weighty the jurisprudence of the Court can be 









the capacity  for  synergy between  international and domestic human  rights  law  in  the United 







to  change  domestic  law  where  inconsistency  has  been  discerned  by  the  European  Court  of 
















The  United  States,  in  contrast,  does  not  tend  to  become  party  to  individual  complaints 
mechanisms  in  international  human  rights  law.50  There  is,  then,  perhaps  a  different  level  of 














has an  international  legal obligation under  that Covenant. The decisions of  the Human Rights 
Committee can  touch on and elucidate  the content and scope of  rights within  that Covenant 





domestic  law  and,  indeed,  compliance—in  the  sense  of  upwards  harmonisation  of  rights 
protecting  standards—can  incorporate  the  interpretation  of  constitutional  civil  rights  by 








the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  have monist  legal  systems  broadly  defined.  This 
means—again at a necessary level of generalisation—that international law ratified by the state 
is  said  to  flow directly and without barrier  into  the domestic  law of  the  ratifying  state and  is 
therefore subject to be pleaded in domestic proceedings. The United Kingdom and Ireland are, 
in  contrast,  dualist  states51  where—up  until  1998  and  2003  respectively—the  European 
Convention  on  Human  Rights  had  not  been  expressly  incorporated.52  However,  as  I  have 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written elsewhere, dualism and anti‐internationalism are not necessary bedfellows.53  In fact,  I 
argue  that  among  dualist  jurisdictions  there  is  a  spectrum  of  internationalisation  relating  to 
unincorporated  international  law.54 Thus,  in  some dualist  states  judges  in  the  superior  courts 
are  quite  willing  to  have  recourse  to  international  human  rights  law  in  the  course  of 
constitutional  interpretation—this  is  quite  evident  in  South  Africa  where  the  Constitution 
expressly  calls  for  such attention  to be paid  to  international human  rights  law,55 but  such an 
express reference is not required. The United States Constitution provides for neither a strictly 
dualist  nor  a  strictly monist  system of  dealing with  international  law.  The  Supremacy  Clause 
provides  for  customary  international  law  to  be  federal  common  law56  and  jurisprudential 
development has resulted  in what are known as self‐executing treaties being considered self‐
incorporating  and non‐self‐executing  treaties  requiring  express  incorporation.57  Incorporation 
of non‐self‐executing treaties makes those treaties binding in domestic  law. This, of course,  is 
relevant  where  one  is  attempting  to  assert  a  treaty‐based  right  in  domestic  proceedings. 
However,  the  kind  of  synergistic  relationship  between  international  human  rights  law  and 
domestic  constitutional  law  envisaged  by  this  author  does  not  hinge  on whether  a  piece  of 
international law is binding domestically or not. In fact, it does not even hinge on whether the 
United States has ratified the particular piece of international law. It is, rather, concerned with 
the  idea that  international human rights  law can and should be seen as a persuasive body of 
law relevant to constitutional interpretation of civil rights, particularly in relation to the content 
and scope of those civil rights in contemporary circumstances. When Kennedy J., for example, 
referred  to  the UN  Convention  on  the  Rights  of  the  Child  in Roper  v  Simmons58  he was  not 
claiming that the Convention was internationally binding on the United States (it  is not as the 
US has not  ratified  it). Neither was he asserting  the domestic  justiciability of  the Convention. 
Rather,  Kennedy  J.  was  using  the  Convention  and  the  standards  set  down  within  it  as  a 
benchmark for the appropriate scope of children’s rights in relation to punishment, which then 


























Recognising  the  potential  of  international  human  rights  law  to  be  an  effective  and  helpful 
persuasive source  in constitutional  interpretation requires a particular attitudinal approach to 
that body of law. Discussions of whether international or domestic law is ‘superior’ are deeply 
unhelpful  in  any  attempt  to  ensure  progression  towards  upwards  harmonisation  in  rights 






an  interloping  body  of  law,  after  all.59  The  difference  is,  perhaps,  that  when  making  their 
decisions constitutional courts do not purport to be making universally applicable law to which 
other  states  are  to  be  measured  and,  to  some  extent,  international  human  rights  law 
adjudicatory  bodies  might  be  said  to.  But  those  international  bodies  are  making  universally 
applicable law in the international sphere. 
 
As  a matter  of  international  law  a  state may  be  obliged  to  ensure  that  its  law  and  practice 
adheres to certain rights‐based standards. The claim is not that this  is the case as a matter of 
domestic  law  although,  in  practical  terms,  domestic  law  is  likely  to  be  examined  for  its 
compatibility  with  those  international  standards  by  those  international  bodies.  Those 
international bodies are, however, assessing compatibility with international  law and not with 
domestic constitutional  law.  In the process of constitutional  interpretation, domestic superior 
courts such as  the United States Supreme Court are  (generally) assessing the compatibility of 
law  or  governmental  action with  domestic  law  unless  international  standards  are  said  to  be 
binding.  A  truly  synergistic  relationship  between  domestic  and  international  human  and  civil 
rights law would see courts—where applicable—considering whether the scope and content of 
constitutional  rights  against  which  governmental  action  is  measured  can  and  should  be 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V. CONCLUSION 
 
Moving  the  discourse  away  from  questions  of  superiority  or  inferiority  of  international  and 
domestic  human  rights  law  in  domestic  litigation  allows  us  to  refocus  debates  on  the 
appropriate  use  of  international  human  rights  law  in  domestic  proceedings.  This  refocusing 
reminds  us  that,  when  used  as  an  aid  to  constitutional  interpretation,  international  human 
rights  law can develop a synergy with domestic rights  law (whether termed ‘human rights’ or 
‘civil  rights’  law)  that  enables  the  upwards  harmonisation  of  these  bodies  of  law  so  that 
domestic  law  protects  individual  rights  effectively.  International  human  rights  laws’  various 
adjudicatory  bodies—such  as  regional  courts  and  treaty‐based  committees—produce 
jurisprudence that can be particularly useful in interpreting the scope and content of rights in a 
contemporary  and  effective manner,  taking  into  account  developments  in  a  range  of  states. 
This jurisprudence offers an obvious persuasive value to the United States Supreme Court when 





superior  courts  in  all  jurisdictions.  Where  the  basic  value  underlying  the  rights  protecting 
provisions in the international and domestic sphere is analogous and essentially dignitary, the 
persuasive value of this international jurisprudence appears to be all the more obvious. Courts 
all  over  the  world—both  domestic  and  international—are  constantly  struggling  with  how  to 
ensure that their basic texts are fit for purpose while not mutilating their meaning beyond clear 
literal  and  teleological  grounds.  Inter‐institutional  and  inter‐jurisdictional  learning  is  both 
sensible from a common sense perspective and productive from the perspective of catalysing 
upwards  harmonisation  of  rights  protection.  This  has,  as  illustrated  in  Part  II,  happened  and 
worked  in  the  context  of  LGBT  rights  in  the Council  of  Europe  and,  as  argued  in  Part  III,  the 
structural differences between Europe and the United States are not so immense as to make a 












or  that of others—and ensuring  the contemporaneousness of  the  fundamental guarantees of 
the  Constitution,  without  eroding  their  substance  and  dignitary  foundation,  are  naturally 
collative processes.  International  human  rights  law  is  another  source  that  can and  should be 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reached  for  in  the  process  of  interpreting  domestic  constitutional  guarantees  in  the  United 
States and, indeed, elsewhere. 
 
